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PERSONS
Katherine Shaw Spaht*
EFFECT OF PRIOR ADJUDICATION OF FAULT UPON ALIMONY INCIDENTAL TO
DIVORCE
Frequently, an adjudication of fault on the part of one spouse is
a necessary element to a judgment of separation or divorce. Since the
1964 amendment to Civil Code article 160, it is clear that courts may
grant post-divorce alimony only to the wife who "has not been at
fault."' Fault, in the alimony context of article 160, has been con-
strued to be at least co-extensive with, and perhaps more expansive
than, the concept of fault employed in separation and divorce ac-
tions.2 The question thence arises, what effect, if any, should a court
give to a prior adjudication of fault in a separation or divorce proceed-
ing in a subsequent action for alimony incidental to divorce?
It has been generally declared that the wife carries the burden
of proving her freedom from fault under article 160. In the 1971 case
of Rayborn v. Rayborn,' however, the First Circuit Court of Appeal
stated that a wife who had obtained a judgment of separation on
grounds of cruelty could shift the burden to her husband by offering
the prior judgment in proof of her own absence of fault.4
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 160: "When the wife has not been at fault, and she has not
sufficient means for her support, the court may allow her, out of the property and
earnings of the husband, alimony which shall not exceed one-third of his income when:
"1. The wife obtains a divorce;
"2. The husband obtains a divorce on the ground that he and his wife have been
living separate and apart, or on the ground that there has been no reconciliation
between the spouses after a judgment of separation from bed and board, for a specified
period of time; or
"3. The husband obtained a valid divorce from his wife in a court of another state
or country which had no jurisdiction over her person.
"This alimony shall be revoked if it becomes unnecessary, and terminates if the
wife remarries."
2. See, e.g., Felger v. Doty, 217 La. 365, 46 So. 2d 300 (1950); Smith v. Smith,
216 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). Professor Pascal concludes, "The decisions as
they now stand are consistent with the view that under Article 160 fault for alimony
purposes includes, but is more inclusive than, fault for divorce purposes." R. PASCAL,
LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE 188 (1973).
3. 246 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), writ refused, 258 La. 775, 247 So. 2d
868 (1971).
4. The decision reversed a refusal by the lower court to allow the husband to
introduce any evidence to show wife's fault. Note that the court limited its decision to
instances in which the husband does not put mutual fault at issue in the prior separa-
tion. In Guarisco v. Guarisco, 271 So. 2d 553 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), the court
reiterated its intention to follow the Rayborn rule.
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Two cases decided by the courts of appeal in 1973 presented
situations in which the husband, rather than the wife, had previously
obtained a judgment of separation based on fault. In Broussard v.
Broussard,' where the husband's prior judgment was based on aban-
donment, the Third Circuit held that the wife was thereafter judi-
cially estopped from introducing evidence to show her alleged free-
dom from fault for alimony purposes. As authority for the rule of
judicial estoppel, the court cited the well-known case of California
Co. v. Price.' For application of the rule to the instant facts, however,
it is probable that the court relied on dicta in Rayborn, in which the
First Circuit opined that it would be repugnant to the law to allow a
spouse in an alimony action to refute a prior adjudication of fault.7
In the second case, Richardson v. Richardson,' the husband had
obtained an uncontested jugment of separation on grounds of habit-
ual intemperance. The unusual procedural history of the case and an
imprecise definition of the crucial issue complicate the opinion, but
the court apparently held that the wife was barred from receiving
alimony under article 160 solely by virtue of the prior judgment adju-
dicating her at fault. The court did not rest its decision upon estoppel
but rather upon its construction of article 160, which "presupposes
instances in which the question of fault has not been determined."9
Apparently, under this theory, the court determined that the wife
had no right of action under the article to claim alimony.
5. 275 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
6. 234 La. 338, 99 So. 2d 743 (1957).
7. The Broussard opinion actually cites Rayborn, although it is unclear for what
point. Judge Miller, dissenting in Broussard, interpreted the opinion as an adoption
of the following dicta from Rayborn: "In a separation suit grounded on cruel treatment
the decision of a husband-defendant not to respond and put at issue mutual fault on
the part of' his wife-plaintiff can be based on valid and proper considerations. Often
the accusations and counter-accusations in a domestic dispute worsens an already
unfortunate situation. The decision of the husband not to appear is not repugnant to
the law because the wife must still come forward with proof of his cruelty to be
successful. However, in a suit for separation grounded on abandonment the decision
not to put the wife's fault at issue is not left to the defendant. The law makes that
decision for him because C.C. Article 143 provides that a judgment can be entered only
in the case where the wife is free from fault, i.e., gave her husband no lawful cause to
leave the common dwelling. This is an essential and indispensable element of proof.
After requiring this proof, we deem it repugnant to the law to allow the husband to
refute the previous judgment when the wife later seeks alimony and fault is again put
at issue. The sanction of such a practice renders the abandonment article meaningless
and judicially condones the misrepresentation of facts presented to the court in the
abandonment proceedings." 275 So. 2d 410, 413-14 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
8. 275 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
9. Id. at 847.
(Vol. 34
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The reasoning of Broussard is clearer and more persuasive than
that'of Richardson, and the principle of estoppel is easier to apply.
However, it is important to observe the pattern of results as well as
to analyze the opinions themselves. Unless checked by an adverse
supreme court decision, lower courts will probably continue to apply
to alimony actions, rules whose purpose is to give effect to prior
adjudications of fault.'"
Already, logically integrated results have begun to emerge. Thus,
where the husband obtains a judgment of separation or divorce based
on fault of the wife, Broussard and Richardson indicate that fault for
purposes of article 160 is determined thereby. Where the wife obtains
such a judgment based on fault of the husband, except on grounds
of abandonment, Rayborn shifts to the husband the burden of proof
in the action for post-divorce alimony. Where the wife obtains a judg-
ment of separation on grounds of abandonment, the wife's freedom
from fault is a necessary element of her cause of action; dicta in
Rayborn indicates judicial estoppel would then apply to establish
conclusively her freedom from fault for post-divorce alimony pur-
poses." Consequently, the ordinary rule under article 160 that the
wife carries the burden of proving absence of fault would govern only
when divorce has been granted on grounds of living separate and
apart either for two years, or for one year following a judgment of
separation on grounds of living separate and apart for one year, as
well as when a divorce has been granted to the wife based upon the
husband's fault.
Judge Miller of the Third Circuit, dissenting in Broussard, has
raised a grave objection to the application of estoppel in actions for
alimony under article 160.12 He points out that a prior adjudication
of fault may not reflect the underlying reality, particularly where the
spouses obtain a mutually desired separation on the relatively inof-
fensive ground of abandonment. The source of the problem is the
requirement that spouses live apart for one year before bringing an
action for separation on no-fault grounds," a delay which induces
10. Justifications include notions of judicial economy, antipathy to conflicting
determinations of fact, and suspicions of collusion in obtaining judgments of separa-
tion.
11. Rayborn v. Rayborn, 246 So. 2d 400, 407 (La. App. lst Cir. 1971). Interest-
ingly, Justice McCaleb had earlier suggested such a result, concurring in Olivier v.
Abunza, 226 La. 456, 76 So. 2d 528 (1954). However, the Rayborn dicta is in conflict
with such cases as Davidson v. Jenkins, 216 So. 2d 682 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) and
Gamino v. Gamino, 199 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
12. Broussard v. Broussard, 275 So. 2d 410, 413 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
13. LA. CIv. CODE art. 138(9).
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many to seek what in reality is a collusive judgment based on fault.
The remedy, however, is not necessarily to try anew the issue of fault
in an alimony context. The legislature can give appropriate relief by
shortening the length of time necessary to live apart before obtaining
a judgment of separation, perhaps to thirty days. Such a change
would eliminate the need for collusion, without drastically restructur-
ing our law or sacrificing the public policy favoring reconciliation."4
SUPPORT FOR EIGHTEEN-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN
Recent decisions of both the Supreme Court of Louisiana and
various appellate courts may have a profound impact on the divorced
wife granted custody of the children. In Bernhardt v. Bernhardt,'5 the
supreme court held that the court of appeal erred in refusing to take
judicial notice of Act 98 of 1972, which amended article 37 of the Civil
Code so as to lower the age of majority to eighteen.'7 Thus, a mother
granted custody of a child had no standing to claim alimony for the
support of a child who was then a major. The major child's remedy,
as suggested by the court, was to "bring an action for support in his
own right under the general right to support article, Civil Code Arti-
cle 229,' in the event that he feels he is entitled to support from his
father.""'
14. The policy favoring reconciliation will continue to be well served by the one
year interval between a judgment of separation and a judgment of divorce under LA.
R.S. 9:302 (1950), as amended by, La. Acts 1960, No. 31 § 1, 1970, No. 476 § 1.
15. 283 So. 2d 226 (La. 1973). See also State v. Jordan, 283 So. 2d 223 (La. 1973)
which concerns the impact of Act 98 of 1972 upon the crime of neglect of family (LA.
R.S. 14:74 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 368 § 1; 1968, No. 233 § 1; 1968,
No. 647 § 1; 1968, Ex. Sess., No. 14 § 1) and the accessory punitive measures of a
conviction (LA. R.S. 14175 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 647 § 1).
16. 271 So. 2d 342 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972), writ granted, 273 So. 2d 836 (1973).
The issue was raised as to the effect of Act 98 of 1972 on the right of the mother to
maintain an action against the father for support of a nineteen-year-old. The court held
that the trial court judgment awarding alimony for support of the child had been
rendered prior to the effective date of the statute, thus the Act had no effect on the
proceeding. (The judgment was rendered on May 11, 1972, and the effective date of
the Act was July 26, 1972.)
17. LA. CiV. CODE art. 37 now provides: "Persons of the age of eighteen years shall
be considered of full age and until they attain that age shall be minors. A person who
is IPersonsf eighteen years of age or older shall be regarded as being fully emanici-
pated, shall be considered adults and shall have the same rights, duties, responsibili-
ties and capacities as persons who are twenty-one years of age or older."
18. LA. CIv. CODE art. 229: "Children are bound to maintain their father and
mother and other ascendants, who are in need; and the relatives in the direct ascending
line are likewise bound to maintain their needy descendants, this obligation being
reciprocal."
19. 283, So. 2d 226, 228 (La. 1973).
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Prior to Bernhardt numerous appellate court decisions had held
that a child having reached the age of eighteen years was no longer
entitled to alimony for his support." In Fellows v. Fellows," the earli-
est of such decisions, the defendant husband appealed that portion
of a judgment awarding alimony for the children's support to the
plaintiff wife. At the time the appeal was perfected, one of the chil-
dren was a twenty-year-old student at Louisiana State University
School of Nursing in New Orleans. The court held that since the child
was no longer a minor under the Civil Code articles 227,22 230,21 and
231,2 1 her remedy was to seek support under the general right to
support governed by Civil Code article 229.
Undoubtedly, the courts have correctly determined that the di-
vorced father's obligation to support his children by means of ali-
mony payments ceases with a child's majority.2 5 The legislative basis
for awarding alimony for the support of minor children has been
article 227 of the Civil Code, imposing a duty upon parents to support
their children; it has never been disputed that this duty relates only
to minor children.
Prior to Act 98 of 1972, the parent under article 227 still had the
duty of educating his children until they reached the age of twenty-
one, an important fact since many children between the ages of eight-
een and twenty-one were enrolled in colleges. The courts consistently
held that the obligation of a divorced parent to educate his minor
children included contribution to his college education if "the parents
are financially able to do so, and where the child's desire, ambition,
capability, academic background and other circumstances indicate
college as a logical and necessary step in the complete education of
the child."2 An award of alimony for support of minor children en-
20. Jackson v. Jackson, 275 So. 2d 456 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); King v. Sanchez,
273 So. 2d 45 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Hargrove v. Hargrove, 272 So. 2d 394 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1973); Fellows v. Fellows, 267 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
21. 267 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
22. LA. CIv. CODE art. 227: "Fathers and mothers, by the very act of marrying,
contract together the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and educating their chil-
dren."
23. LA. CIv. CODE art. 230: "By alimony we understand what is necessary for the
nourishment, lodging and support of the person who claims it.
"It includes the education, when the person to whom the alimony is due, is a
minor."
24. LA. CIv. CODE art. 231: "Alimony shall be granted in proportion to the wants
of the person requiring it, and the circumstances ot those who are to pay it."
25. Wilson v. Wilson, 205 La. 196, 17 So. 2d 249 (1944); Tolley v. Karcher, 196
La. 685, 200 So. 4 (1941); Wright v. Wright, 189 La. 539, 179 So. 866 (1938).
26. Pettitt v. Pettitt, 261 So. 2d 687, 689 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
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rolled in college was usually substantial.27
It is highly dubious that the award of alimony under article 229
will be comparable to awards previously made under article 227. A
difference exists between the duty imposed upon a parent under arti-
cle 227 and that imposed upon an ascendant under article 229. Plan-
iol in his treatise recognized the difference and described it as follows:
Care must be taken not to confuse the special duty imposed upon
a father and a mother toward their children [Article 227] with
the much more general obligation called the alimentary obliga-
tion. [Article 229] . . . The duty of parents ceases at their chil-
dren's majority. After its majority, a child may still have a right
to receive sustenance, but under the ordinary conditions applica-
ble to it, that is when it is in need. Its upbringing, with the special
expenses it entails, is finished."
The obligation of a parent toward his minor children under arti-
cle 227 must be considered a more onerous obligation than that im-
posed upon ascendants under article 229. In recQgnition of the dis-
tinction between the obligations, courts have usually awarded sub-
stantially lower amounts under article 229.9 A divorced mother who
previously eagerly anticipated her children's entrance into college
confident of an increase in court-ordered child-support payments
must now carefully consider whether or not a college education is
essential to her child's welfare.
27. Id. at 687. Mrs. Pettitt had brought an action for an increase in alimony for
the children's support to include college expenses. The court increased the child sup-
port payment for the minor entering college from $100 per month, which was a provi-
sion of the original divorce judgment, to $175 per month beginning in September
conditioned upon the minor's actual enrollment in college. See also Paddison v. Paddi-
son, 255 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971) (Because one of the three remaining minor
children had entered college, the court increased the child support award from $230
per month to $330 per month for each child.)
28. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 1682 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
29. Tolley v. Karcher, 196 La. 685, 200 So. 4 (1941) (destitute middle-aged daugh-
ter awarded $10 per week from mother); Barcelo v. Barcelo, 175 La. 398, 143 So. 354
(1932) (destitute granddaughter awarded $15 per month from grandfather); Elchinger
v. Elchinger, 181 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965) (mentally afflicted major son
originally awarded $450 per month reduced to $150 per month); Johnson v. Johnson,
128 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) (interdicted major child awarded $40 per
month.)
[Vol. 34
